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A new economic model for analysis of scholarly publishing—journal publishing in 
particular—is proposed that draws on club theory. The standard approach builds on 
market failure in the private production (by research scholars) of a public good (new 
scholarly knowledge). In that model publishing is communication, as the 
dissemination of information. But a club model views publishing differently: namely 
as group formation, where members form groups in order to confer externalities on 
each other, subject to congestion. A journal is a self-constituted group, endeavouring 
to create new knowledge. In this sense ‘a journal is a club’. The knowledge club 
model of a journal seeks to balance the positive externalities due to a shared resource 
(readers, citations, referees) against negative externalities due to crowding 
(decreased prospect of publishing in that journal). A new economic model of a 
journal as a ‘knowledge club’ is elaborated. We suggest some consequences for the 
management of journals and financial models that might be developed to support 
them. 
Economists against journals 
The existence of commercial scholarly journal publishers follows from the economics 
of specialisation and the division of labour. Lacy (1963; prior to gender-neutral 
scholarly language) put it like this:  
Between the artist and his audience stands the medium of communication through 
which he must reach them: … the broadcast networks, the publishing houses. …  
Throughout history an entrepreneur of some kind has assembled the artist’s audience 
and given him the chance to be heard. 
Substitute ‘scholar’ for artist and ‘other scholars’ for audience, and we have the 
standard modern commercial model of journal publishing. From the perspective of 
economic analysis, this model is predicated on the efficient organisation of specialised 
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capital and skills required to produce and distribute scholarly journals, and 
recognition that those capabilities were not efficiently possessed by scholars (or 
artists), as the producers and consumers of scholarly output. The economic logic of 
this situation resulted in the papyrocentric business model (Harnad 1995; where 
‘papyrocentric’ invokes paper distribution, but also collects the most developed 
organisational form––publishers) of a closed-access journal in which a private 
publishing company held the intellectual property rights and was supplied with free 
content and free labour (Bergstrom 2001, Houghton and Oppenheim 2010). 
This modern economic model, with its attendant commercial players and 
profits, is a departure from the original model of journals. While part of the original 
motivation of the first research publication in serial form—the Philosophical 
Transactions of the Royal Society in 1665—was to make money (Hall 1954), the early 
history of scholarly publishing is largely one of community subsidy to cover losses or 
breaking even. The first serials to which the name ‘journal’ was applied in the 19th 
century often struggled to find audiences sufficiently large to justify the printing of 
content of interest to professional researchers. The modern system developed only in 
the mid-20th century. The wartime and post-war expansion of public research funding 
and consequent expansion and globalisation of research communities were soon 
exploited by an entrepreneur-led proliferation of increasingly specialised journals, 
following the lead of Robert Maxwell’s Pergamon Press (Buranyi, 2017). The small 
society presses, struggling to cope with growing scale, were supported and then 
largely supplanted by the ‘big 5’ commercial presses: Elsevier (which acquired 
Pergamon in 1991), Wiley, Springer, Taylor & Frances and Sage. These newly 
empowered players brought an industrial approach to the publication and 
dissemination process, for the first time realising the benefits that those specialised 
capital and skills could provide by operating at a scale that was unprecedented to that 
date. The successful publishers grew—and consolidated to grow further—alongside a 
pre-Cambrian explosion and specialisation of journals to create the landscape today 
where the majority of journals are owned, controlled or at least produced by a handful 
of globalised companies.  
But with the arrival of the PC, the internet—and soon the blockchain—the 
economics of this model have shifted (Kahin and Varian 2000, Gans 2000, Bergstrom 
and Bergstrom 2001, Fyffe and Shulenburger 2002, Willinsky 2005, Houghton and 
Sheehan 2009, Houghton and Oppenheim 2010). The wide availability of desktop 
hardware and software enabled new capabilities among authors, and an expectation 
from publishers that they would self-manage much of the layout and editing of 
articles. Meanwhile, technologies for storing articles (databases), discovering articles 
(digital object identifiers and advanced search technologies), citing and reviewing, 
made it easier academics to engage with each other’s work. This has forced two 
interrelated pressures on the extant scholarly publishing model that taken together 
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suggest: (1) that it is profoundly broken (Bergstsrom and Bergstrom 2006); and (2) 
that a general move to an Open Access regime is imminent or under way (Bergstrom 
and Bergstrom 2004; Willinsky 2006, 2009; Houghton 2011, Armstrong 2014; 
McCabe and Snyder 2014).  
First, it is no longer clear that the closed access proprietary model is at all 
necessary (Houghton 2001). As the economists Conley and Wooders (2009: 71) 
explain: 
Open access journals have overwhelming cost advantage over commercial publishers. 
In addition, open-access is consistent with our mission as scholars to increase and 
spread knowledge and also feeds our personal and professional interests much more 
directly. But we are still living with the system of scholarly communication we 
inherited from the papyrocentric era. 
Second, the modern digital open access model still preserves many 
dysfunctional aspects of the older model of the scholarly journal, including, as Bruno 
Frey (2003) points out, the tendency for scholars to have to ‘prostitute’ themselves 
before editors and referees, owing to the veto power that referees wield and the 
perceived necessity of journal publication to climb career ladders. Frey proposes a 
series of institutional reforms in the way property rights work in scholarly publishing 
to mitigate this. Furthermore, as Conley (2012) editorialises, the result is bad for the 
scholarly community because it entrenches a model with very high rejection rates that 
is inordinately wasteful of ‘free’ scholarly resources. Conley finds that this represents:  
a compelling reason to take advantage of new technologies to take control of 
certifying and distributing research away from commercial publishers and return it to 
scholarly community. 
The twentieth-century publishing model made economic sense as outsourced 
specialisation, but technological change has upended that logic by dramatically 
lowering the cost of in-house production. The old model holds on through legacy 
effects and competitive ‘costly signalling’ of perceived prestige through selected 
mastheads, and has transformed into a model of monopoly exploitation. This is costly 
in pecuniary terms, but also in the ability of scholarly communities to develop and 
change publishing institutions to suit their own needs. There is now a broad consensus 
that the economics of scholarly publishing is broken and that a new way forward turns 
on exploitation of new open access-business models (Binfield 2013). But open access 
models, including hybrid models (Björk 2012), are also proving difficult to 
implement, running into problems of cost, free-riding and incompatibility with extant 
scholarly research institutions (Neylon 2015a).  
This paper proposes a new approach to the economics of scholarly publishing 
that is based around the joint production and consumption of scholarly output by the 
scholarly community. We argue that this can be represented not as an economics of 
	4		
firms, markets and specialisation, but as an economics of team production and 
consumption in clubs or, as we style them, ‘knowledge clubs’ (Hartley 2015).    
 
The organisation of scholarly publishing 
The organisation of scholarly publishing, and indeed its broader political-economy 
context, can usefully be understood through the narrower lens of economic analysis. 
The economics of publishing—and not only scholarly publishing but also quality 
news journalism—is usually formulated as an intermediating service in the production 
and consumption of a private good (information) with public good-like properties 
(owing to appropriability and positive externalities). Significant fixed costs in 
publishing, mostly due to capital requirements (e.g. printing presses and distribution 
networks) and specialist skills (e.g. typesetting, editing) tended this model toward 
imperfect competition. The information economics of branded quality signalling—in 
authors, mastheads and presses—also tended to reinforce a winner-take-all 
oligopolistic market structure. Alternative institutional arrangements and experiments 
were created for communities and subcultures (for instance zines) in reaction to these 
outcomes. For the most part, within the news media and publishing domains, these 
group-based efforts remained marginal players (Rennie 2006). But when the 
technology of publishing changes, so does everything else (Eisenstein 1982, Ong 
2012). 
Through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, entrepreneurial solutions were 
institutionally embedded within business models that furnished workable solutions to 
this problem. For instance, publicly funded university libraries maintained print 
subscriptions to large suites of scholarly journals; or newspapers, which often held 
monopoly positions, cross-subsidised news journalism with classified advertising. 
The crisis in scholarly publishing in which new digital technologies run headlong into 
old business models, has been diagnosed as a form of disruption awaiting 
transformation, possibly through new models of public subsidy, new business models, 
or both.  
One common way to look at this is through the lens of an evolutionary 
industrial transformation—i.e. what Joseph Schumpeter called ‘creative 
destruction’—involving deep endogenous change in the organisational and market 
order. Individual academics who both produce and consume journals may worry 
about whether the unfolding sequence of development will eventually be 
characterised by a cataclysmic shakeout or by a smoother sequence of adjustments in 
what broadly appears to be the standard view—through the lens of the Schumpeterian 
industrial transformation model—of the current crisis in scholarly publishing and 
quality journalism.    
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The consequence of this ‘narrative of disruption’, whether promoted by 
advocates or feared (or disdained) by commercial incumbents, is that it depends on 
new entrepreneurs to create new markets. The narrative ‘predicts’ that the 
Schumpeterian arrival of these new players will defeat the once lean competitors of 
the mid-to-late twentieth century that have become bloated monopolists through 
consolidation. The new technology opportunity and entrepreneurial competition will 
sort this out through an industrial transformation from one technological model (the 
printing press and physical distribution) and one financial model (universities’ 
subscriptions) to a new technological model (free online distribution of ‘web native 
content’) and consequently new financial models (currently controversial but, 
according to the Schumpeterian model, surely to be determined by ‘the market’). This 
narrative has no place for the actual generators and consumers of value, the research 
author, review, editor, and reader. 
The ‘disruption’ narrative sits atop a broader one of the transformation from 
closed private goods (the profits of publishers) into public (and therefore open) goods. 
The dichotomy between private and public goods is central to the rhetoric of Open 
Access advocates, whose arguments seem largely rooted in economics and politics of 
public good provisioning. By the same token it is also central to the rhetoric of 
traditional publisher lobbyists and traditionalists within the research community, who 
argue that the twentieth-century industrial model is a successful public-private 
partnership in which commercial entities obtain a reasonable return on private 
investment and the research community receives a useable public-like good in return 
for its contributions. But once again, these arguments, while often referencing ‘the 
community’, usually without defining it, rarely engage with how ‘the community’ is 
constituted, what it is contributing and what it receives in return for any specific 
journal. 
An alternative view would be to place the community at the centre of an 
economic model. This would provide an alternative both to the twentieth-century 
broadcast/industrial model built on rational specialisation and to the political 
argumentation based on the public-private dichotomy. Such a model would focus on 
the (self)-identity, contribution and benefits to a community. We believe that this 
form of model could provide new insight into methods by which a given community 
can sustain itself, supporting the re-emergence of local commons, or clubs (Harvie 
2004). Such a model may also help to refine arguments that placing ‘the community’ 
at the centre of scholarly publishing would be a return to the 18th and 19th century 
roots of our publishing system (Fyfe et al, 2017). Our argument therefore is that we 
need to consider what it means to view scholarly publishing through the lens of club 
theory and the concept of a club good. 
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Knowledge clubs 
Club theory introduces an intermediate option between the economics of a world 
made entirely of individuals coordinated by markets (private goods), and a world of a 
collective coordinated by the state (public goods), with a third class that is based 
around the formation of self-interested and coordinated groups (or clubs). A club can 
be simply a firm that both produces and consumes. A moment’s reflection on the fact 
that scholars both produce and consume their own product does suggest that club 
theory is prima facie a good approximation of scholarly publishing (Neylon 2015a, 
2015b). To expand this, we will need to consider who may be identified as ‘members’ 
of this club and what are the various contributions and benefits for members.  
Traditionally we would consider a journal as a node that organises market 
relations among authors, readers and specialist publishing capabilities. This naturally 
leads to the presumption of outsourcing of various of these roles in a competitive 
market. In our new model we see a journal as club, in which access to those services 
is internalised as a membership benefit. While those services might still be outsourced 
in practice it can be seen that such a shift potentially has substantial political and 
economic consequences in how we see the relations between players: owners of 
capital and their customers are seen as service-providers to communities.  
We have a good economic understanding of the former, but not of the latter. 
Our argument here then is to elucidate a club-theoretic understanding of scholarly 
publishing and to use this to probe the current economic and political crises 
challenging the current systems. We focus entirely on scholarly publishing in 
journals, but the general points we advance, mutatis mutandis, extend to scholarly 
publishing in books (Montgomery 2015), and to quality journalism, to which we 
return in conclusion. The reason for this tight focus is that scholarly journals, most 
particularly small society journals, present the clearest example of the ‘knowledge 
club’ model. 
The concept of a knowledge club is based on the ‘demic-diffusion’ model of 
cultural science developed by Hartley and Potts (2014). This is a coherent analytical 
framework built out of a synthesis of cultural studies, evolutionary economics and 
evolutionary biology in which the core hypothesis is that the evolutionary function of 
culture is to form groups, that the evolutionary function of culture-formed groups is to 
produce knowledge, and that the selection mechanism over those groups operates at 
the margin of other groups, i.e. knowledge is most intensively produced at group-
boundaries, in interaction with other, competing groups. The purpose of cultural 
science is to naturalise the study of culture, based around the growth of knowledge, 
and therein to endogenise human group formation about knowledge production and 
consumption. This paper will not advance that model directly, but it is an application 
of cultural science in that it points the analysis of ‘the publishing problem’ to consider 
group-formation dynamics. A purpose of this paper, then, is to explore this cultural 
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science hypothesis using the (well-known and established) tools of the economics of 
club theory.    
To reform scholarly publishing, we need therefore to start by recognising that 
a journal is a club. A scholarly journal is neither a private good nor a public good—it 
is a club good (Neylon 2015a). A journal is a publishing operation, both in production 
and in consumption, which is best understood—dynamically as well as statically—as 
a club good, meaning that the basic economics of club goods should help in making 
sense of the turmoil that the scholarly publishing industry is currently experiencing.       
 
What is a club good? 
If a journal is ideally a club, what then is a club? Economic theory has a very specific 
answer to this question. Club goods are distinguished from private goods (where 
consumption is both rivalrous and excludable) and public goods (where consumption 
is non-rivalrous and exclusion is not possible) by being non-rivalrous (up to a 
congestion point) but excludable. Completing the standard four-term matrix are 
common pool resources, which are rivalrous but non-excludable (Ostrom 1990). Club 
goods are also known as ‘toll goods’ (Ostrom and Ostrom 1999), because the 
congestion point requires a toll for efficiency; and also as ‘local public goods’ 
(Scotchmer 2002), because groups are often spatially organised.   
The concept of a club good was introduced into economic theory by James 
Buchanan (1965) (Sandler 2013) to recognise that the Samuelsonian division between 
private goods provided by markets and public goods provided by the state (Samuelson 
1954) was missing an important institutional construction, in the ability of small 
organised groups (Olson 1965) to come together privately to produce and consume 
local public goods. Club theory is now a standard foundation of modern general 
equilibrium microeconomics (Berglas 1976; Sandler and Tschirhart 1980, 1997). 
Buchanan’s point was that many things that were commonly portrayed as public 
goods—hospitals, schools, roads, swimming pools, etc.—were actually better 
understood as club goods.  
The political-economy imperative behind the ‘club goods’ concept was not on 
the side of markets-versus-the-state, but rather a more oblique point on the private-
public continuum, in that it argued for the economic efficiency of organised free 
individuals (groups, associations) to form groups that could self-govern to produce 
public goods (and that this outcome is economically superior to both market solutions 
and government solutions). Clubs are ‘non-market’ solutions to public-good problems 
that rely on the ability of self-constituted groups both to self-organise and successfully 
to self-govern. They are non-market solutions in the technical sense that they do not 
rely on private property rights and price mechanisms for coordination of the club 
good, but rather on culture (shared understandings and norms etc.) and governance 
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institutions. This usually happens locally, for what is increasingly recognised as 
evolutionary-theoretic reasons (Bowles and Gintis 2009), hence the local public-good 
focus on such things as health clubs, sports clubs, learning clubs (libraries), transport 
clubs (toll-roads), and so on. But note that the internet and its digital affordances 
make that group-formation less a spatial phenomenon and more a cultural 
phenomenon. This is the true implication of Anderson’s ‘long-tail’ thesis (2006): that 
the internet allows connection into clubs to occur without reference to ethno-territorial 
boundaries, such that locally unviable nodes of common interest can ‘club together’ 
across cyberspace to create a community of affinity and thence a market. Locality is 
no longer necessarily geographic, but may be demic. Clubs, then, refer to the 
formation of groups of people who share a common concern, who are willing to pool 
their common resources and specialisation-skills, and to act in concert in pursuit of 
‘shared externalities’.1 This is why the economics of clubs overlaps substantially with 
the economics of knowledge commons (Ostrom and Hess 2007, Frishmann et al. 
2014).  
In a market of individual actors, the key institutional mechanism of 
coordination is bilateral exchange. If both parties expect to gain, such that marginal 
private benefit is greater than marginal private cost, then the transaction will occur 
and not otherwise. This principle underpins both general equilibrium theory and 
welfare economics. In the state or government, the key institutional mechanism is 
coercion to overcome free-riding in providing a public good, such that the sum of 
marginal benefits for each agent is greater than the total marginal cost of public 
provision. This principle underpins the logic of the state and its powers. In a club, the 
key institutional mechanism is voluntary culture-made group formation, such that the 
private benefit condition holds for a shared good. Clubs are ‘voluntary’ in the 
language of microeconomics, but in cultural science ‘voluntary’ should be understood 
as a secondary feature of culture-made groups. Culture makes groups that are unified 
and bounded by shared codes, relationships, identity and meaning. The production of 
‘free individuals’, who are in possession of the ‘economic rationality’ needed 
‘voluntarily’ to ‘choose’ to join or form a club, is a function of culture-made ‘we’-
groups or demes. It follows that not everyone can join a club (demic outsiders); and 
that free individual choice is itself a product or outcome of demes, not a causal 
mechanism by itself. This, first and foremost, is a socio-cultural principle, not an 
economic or political one. Scotchmer (2002: 1999) explains:  
Club models are models of group formation. … The basic notion of club economies is 
that agents form groups to confer externalities on each other. The main source of 
these externalities in the original Buchanan (1965) paper are public services. 
Buchanan assumes that agents band together to share the cost of (excludable) public 																																																								
1 This is closely related to the concept of a community of practice (Amin and Roberts 2008).	
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goods. Optimal sharing groups are bounded in size because of a second externality, 
crowding. 
It is most intuitive to think of a club as relating to a shared resource, such as a 
local swimming-pool, but Scotchmer’s language is precise: ‘agents form groups to 
confer externalities on each other’. Clubs are in this sense necessarily economically 
rational (and politically viable) about the costs and benefits of group formation. 
Individuals join clubs because they expect to benefit. In the case of scholarly journals, 
the benefits consist of identity, where participation in the making of journal goods 
legitimizes and validates status (cf. Lave and Wenger, 1991), prestige, where citations 
accrue from participation either as a contributor or an editor (and less successfully as 
a reviewer) via a group of readers either within that club or aspiring to it. The ‘club’ is 
therefore not the reading public as traditionally understood (Watt 1957), but a 
membership that is group-recognised through shared codes and peer-based 
knowledge-sharing activities.   
Sandler and Tschirhart (1997: 336–7) explain five key differences in the 
economic properties of clubs and club goods with respect to public goods:  
(1)  Clubs are voluntary, which means that members join clubs only where they 
expect a net benefit (hence for a club good, unlike a public good, the marginal rate of 
substitution is always positive).  
(2)  Clubs involve sharing, which results in crowding (or congestion). Crowding 
implies an upper limit of the optimal size of the club, and tolls to control crowding. 
There are two types of crowding: anonymous, and non-anonymous, where attributes 
of other members are important determinants of crowding. 
(3)  Clubs imply finite groups that balance at the margin externality benefits with 
costs associated with crowding, such that there are non-members who are excluded. 
This also implies an exclusion mechanism that operates at less cost than the benefits 
from the club.  
(4)  Clubs can partition over a population, enabling competition between clubs. 
For any population, and for a given externality and congestion function, there will 
exist an optimal number of clubs. 
(5)  A club involves two simultaneous choices: membership size and provision 
level of the shared good. 
 A club, therefore, is a self-organising group that, in the language of 
microeconomics, expects to benefit from the net externalities they impose on each 
other, minus the costs of doing so, and organised such that an optimal club size exists 
(because of crowding). Clubs are ‘voluntary’ (in the microeconomic rather than 
cultural sense), clubs involve pooling resources, and clubs involve exclusion 
mechanisms, which are endogenous aspects of the voluntary pooling mechanisms that 
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define the economics of a club. The implication, as Buchanan (1965) first pointed out, 
is that clubs have optimal sizes that are determined by technological and institutional 
factors. Many forms of economic organisation are clubs and, in the past 40 years, 
economists have explored some of their most of the obvious instances, as well as 
many less obvious forms (Scotchmer 2002). The central implication is that scholarly 
journals originate within clubs. We argue that they work best when they are organised 
as clubs, in the sense of ‘knowledge clubs’, but that there has been an unfortunate but 
pervasive tendency to try and push them towards operating as market goods (privately 
supplied by publishing firms) or as public goods (Open Access). But a journal is in 
essence a club good. 
 
The economics of knowledge production & consumption 
To identify a scholarly journal as a club, we need to connect the basic elements of 
club theory, which is about a group and the public good it seeks to produce and 
consume, to the externalities it seeks to impose and the congestion effects it will 
experience.  
The first part is simple. The group is scholars interested in a particular 
question or intellectual domain. This is the extension of the fabled ‘invisible college’ 
(de Solla Price 1963) or ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1991) of scholars who 
pursue ideas, seeking each other out to advance a domain of knowledge in which they 
all have a stake. Publishing is also a crucial part of creating a scholarly identity and 
central to learning to part of the community of a discipline (Lave and Wenger, 1991). 
Scholars are perhaps the most club-like of all animals, outside the military.  
The less obvious part is about the costs and benefits of a scholarly publishing 
club, or knowledge club. First, a journal is a club where members ‘confer externalities 
on each other’. They do so in both production and consumption. The externalities here 
are those of reading, understanding, citing and refereeing the papers that each scholar 
writes. Scholarly papers are written to be read and then to be acted upon by other 
scholars: they are not simply consumption goods, but inputs into further scholarly 
production. They are both outputs and inputs. In fact, ‘membership’, communication 
and action in this context are all better explained as functions of culture and language 
than of economic exchange, which is but a means to an end, although the economic-
cultural combination results in the growth of knowledge. This is how scholarly 
production and publishing differs from the publishing of novels or journalism, for 
example, in that the producers and the consumers are not distinct sets; rather they are 
an overlapping set: a club. (This raises the interesting question of whether large-scale 
scholarly-commercial journals like Nature, Science, etc. are journals (club-goods) or 
journalism (market-goods).) The producers of scholarly knowledge seek to ‘impose 
externalities’ on each other. They want not just to produce papers, but to produce 
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papers that will be read by a particular other group, possibly anonymous and unmet—
as in the ‘invisible college’—but quite precisely imagined. They are ‘producing’ a 
scholarly field, that is, a culture-made group. 
The shared good in production is mutual attention to an idea, which is the 
good allegedly supplied by the publishing intermediary in the idealised form of 
generalised attention (Lanham 2006). Compared to a private good, where such 
attention must be purchased, scholarly publishing provides that for free (this is in 
effect the ‘toll’). But what scholars are purchasing in their supply of content is clearly 
a club good: it is shared access to the benefits of other smart, like-minded scholars, 
who are implicitly part of an open team-production exercise––itself imagined as part 
of a larger knowledge commons.2   
From the communication perspective, congestion or crowding is a more 
difficult concept to grasp. Knowledge producers could reasonably be expected to 
prefer more readers than fewer, and to prefer higher-quality (better informed or 
placed) rather than lower-quality readers. The ‘positive externality’ they wish to 
‘impose’ is knowledge, such that the fullest extent of the ‘imagined community’ is not 
confined to disciplinary specialists but may extend to all within a particular deme: for 
example, ‘our’ industry, city, nation, or even species. But in practice, scholarly 
production does not take ‘humanity’ or any other general population as its 
interlocutor. Most scholars actually have in mind a finite and possibly small (long-
tail) set of readers—even when these are people they may not know, or who may exist 
only in the future. Scholarly production is for a community of peers. Both the 
production and the consumption realities of scholarship and science mean that there is 
only a finite set of people who are potential readers of that product. This is a 
minimum value subset of the ideal club, meaning that the publishing club experiences 
heterogeneous crowding (Scotchmer 2002). The key point is that the set of potential 
producers and the set of incumbent consumers are the same set, although actual 
producers may harbour ambitions to enlarge the club by attracting previously 
unengaged readers. That same set of individual producers seeking knowledge 
dispersion is also competing to publish in the same attention space, as defined by the 
finite qualities of a journal, which is therefore a club.  
A journal is a club because there is both shared positive externalities, as the 
prime resource, which is new knowledge by self and others;3 and there is congestion, 
caused by finite attention in the readers, and in one’s own time, to read, understand, 																																																								
2 We mean this in the sense of both open innovation economics (i.e. models of open knowledge production, e.g. 
von Hippel (2005), Chesbrough (2003)), and also of team production (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). An ‘open 
team’ is a concept that is separately defined in microeconomics, but not in its conjunction (cf. an innovation 
commons).	
3 Scholarly publishing has the same logic as a research department – in the sense of why science organises itself 
into problem-domain themes – a point that has been made by Kling et al. (2002) in reference to the efficacy of the 
underlying ‘guild model’ of scientific production and publishing.	
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comment, critique and, ultimately most important, to adopt. A scholarly journal is 
therefore a club in the specific senses of being: (1) voluntary; (2) non-anonymously 
crowded; (3) exclusive; (4) globally partitioned; and (5) rationally constructed:  
(1)  Voluntary means that agents within a given demic group join clubs based on a 
rational calculus. If the benefits are greater than the costs, then you join a club. The 
benefits are basically those of being read by others; the costs are those of reading and 
citing others, and aligning your productive purposes with the ideas of the club. 
Voluntary means that you make this choice based on your best assessment of career 
payoff and field (or deme) prosperity. 
(2)  Non-anonymously crowded means that you care who else is in the club. So it’s 
not just cost-sharing, as it were contributing to a swimming pool, but also costly 
signalling, because the more prestigious or authoritative the other members, the more 
exclusive and therefore valuable is your membership (Potts et al., 2008). The 
implication from club theory economics is that we can expect differential tolls, as 
access price, which may sometimes be negative.4 Crowding means that each 
additional club member imposes a cost, and the most obvious cost in a scholarly club 
is access to the journal, not simply as a reader but as access to the means of 
production and dissemination. In a knowledge club with 30 members, you may get 
published, on average, once a year. In a knowledge club with 300 or 3000 members 
that frequency is lower. But of course there is more knowledge (and prestige up to a 
congestion point) in the larger club, so on balance there will be a trade-off on both 
margins. 
(3)  Exclusion means that a club is a mechanism for limiting the benefits of non-
members, which happens quite naturally (i.e. culturally) in scholarly knowledge clubs, 
by simple ‘cost’ of access in time and language. Scholarly communities use specific 
language, partly for precision and partly for exclusion (Pagel 2012). But knowledge 
clubs in general arrive at exclusion technologies, not all of which are technological – 
indeed, many of them are social and cultural, creating boundaries in the way that 
languages do. It is usually easy to tell insiders (specialists or scientists in general) 
from outsiders (inexpert disciplines or general populations). Hostile pranks such as 
the Sokal hoax/fraud (Sturrock 1998) demonstrate that clubs may be hoodwinked by 
outsiders who apparently ‘speak their language’ but are in fact using it to challenge 
their knowledge. In short, patterns of inclusion/exclusion are demic, not economic. 
(4)  Global partition recognises that clubs will be finite and that there will be other 
clubs emerging at the margin, and possibly closely related (or identical, as in public 
good clubs over spatial domains). But in scholarly publishing, club theory predicts 
that there will be many entrepreneurial opportunities at the margin of each club. In 																																																								
4 For example, invited articles with the impression of lower reviewing barriers, or free submission of reviews to 
APC funded journals. 	
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essence, club theory implies that there will also be ongoing competition, and therefore 
that the rent each club creates is ultimately contestable (Baumol et al 1982). One 
reason for this is the accelerating number of overlapping clubs, commons and demes 
to which any one individual may belong (Hartley and Potts 2014: 216-7). There are 
more clubs-per-person, leading to a higher-level congestion of clubs, such that 
choices to participate exceed attention capacity. In scholarly publishing, this manifests 
in a proliferation of journals about a given topic (e.g. at least one from each of the Big 
5 publishers), such that even motivated and active scholars can’t follow all of them. 
Cultural distinctions based on territory, affinity or ideology begin to play a greater 
role than ‘long tail’ theory would require; simultaneously, the ‘toll’ exacted for entry 
to any one knowledge club may increasingly be resented and avoided. 
(5)  Rational construction means that club choice is a dual choice of membership 
(to join or not – as demand) and also of quantity (what level the club will supply). The 
level of interdependent externality (the local public good) a club chooses to offer also 
affects the demand for that club, which in turn affects the toll that club can charge at 
the margin. The point is that in general equilibrium this choice is determined 
simultaneously. In scholarly publishing, at least one of these variables is 
expectational. In consequence, knowledge clubs are speculative assets. 
 
Clubs in practice: From an idealised case towards reality 
The simplest way to apply the model is to the case of an idealised small scholarly 
society. While this is highly simplified, it is still close to the reality of some small 
scholarly societies in the humanities. As a starting point we consider a society 
focussed on a specific area of research that publishes one journal that is made 
available to members. In this idealised case, the overall community of interest is clear 
as it is the set of members of the society. This – again in our simplified case – is the 
same as the set of readers of journal. Authors and reviewers are assumed to come 
from the membership. Members support the society through membership fees that 
sustain access to the means of producing the journal (this might be managed in house 
or more likely contracted out). Membership is voluntary, at least in the sociological 
sense referred to above.  
Congestion occurs in two places: in access to publication space within the journal 
itself (a restriction that applies mores strongly to print but remains, albeit at a reduced 
level, for online journals); and in access to the attention and readership of subscribing 
members. Crowding is non-anonymous. Authors, and other members, care a great 
deal about who else is a member, who else is an author and exactly how the attention 
of specific readers is apportioned (Potts et al. 2008). Invitations to provide reviews 
and commentary, effectively offering space in the journal and a line on the CV with 
lower than usual barriers to entry (i.e. less heavily reviewed) show the differential 
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tolls in play. Having the right people publish in the journal adds prestige benefits for 
all members. 
Exclusion occurs trivially through a lack of access to non-members. Less 
trivially, library subscriptions are almost always substantially more expensive than 
individual memberships. Language and shared narratives will also contribute to 
exclusion but the primary mode is through exclusion from the status of member of the 
society, conferred only on those who, tautologically, are paid-up members. The path 
to membership may be more or less clear but can be understood as through the lens of 
legitimate peripheral participation as described by Lave and Wenger (1991), who 
place the issue of community at the centre of their analysis of situated learning. This 
reinforces the role of learning the language, and identity making (and hence prestige 
of the community as a motivation towards identity making) as core elements of 
community definition and therefore exclusion. 
The club is finite, both in terms of authors and society members (at least at any 
given point in time) and will frequently be in competition with other similar clubs at 
the margins. This competition has increased with the gradual disappearance, once 
distribution was first industrialised and then digitised, of many national or local 
societies that flourished in a world of physical distribution and face-to-face meetings. 
Finally, the choice to join is clearly dependent on an expectation of what 
benefits will arise, both in terms of content of the journal and opportunities to publish. 
In principle a member’s choice to join and the club’s decision to publish are both 
rational and dependent on each other. 
Adding complexity to the model 
The simple model of a society journal described above is an idealised case in which 
the club-like nature of all the relevant activities is clear. However, while it captures 
the historical roots of many of today’s journals and publishers, it misses many 
important complexities of real cases. Perhaps the most obvious is that the financial 
cost of supporting most journals is today supported largely by academic libraries. 
Membership of an academic institution, with the relevant benefits including 
access to subscription content, is another parallel club. This complicates the situation 
but also in part clarifies it by separating financial contributions from others, including 
the effort of reviewing, authorship, and editorial work, as well as the less tangible 
labour of constructing and reinforcing the club identity. Further work will be needed 
to define those situations which are better analysed as complex clubs, with differential 
membership contributions, and those where multiple clubs are interacting. 
The second complexity is the way in which the communities of authors, 
readers, and editorial contributors have drifted apart over the course of the 20th 
century. In its extreme we can compare cases such as Nature where the authorship 
community is a miniscule part of the readership community, but also cases like PLOS 
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ONE where a very large set of authors cannot be said to be members of an identifiably 
functioning community. There are clubs within the set of PLOS ONE authors and 
editors, and it could be argued that the authors in Nature (but not the readers) make up 
a––highly exclusive––club. However, the clubs of readers, authors, editors, and (as 
illustrated by the role of academic libraries) financial supporters have drifted apart. 
The first point to make is that we diagnose this as a problem, potentially a 
serious one. If our argument is that clubs and communities are capable of acting 
together to solve collective action provisioning problems in ways that are more 
efficient than either markets or the state, then the dissolution of clubs, or their 
inability to coordinate, will lead to inefficient or non-existent provisioning. Our model 
predicts that journals like Nature and PLOS ONE will be found to be economically 
inefficient when properly analysed. Others have noted that the loss of community 
control over journal production appears to lead to higher costs, and therefore 
implicitly economic inefficiencies (Fyfe et al., 2017). We would not however argue 
that a return to economic and governance models of the 18th and 19th century is the 
solution. Rather that we need to understand how todays clubs and communities 
interact with each other.  
Nonetheless, for all that the clear alignment of author and reader clubs has 
degraded, the identity of scholars remains tightly bound to our choices of where (and 
how) to publish. Membership of an academic community may be tied to publication 
in specific venues (and vice versa; e.g. you can’t publish in Cinema Journal unless 
you’re a member of the Society for Cinema and Media Studies), or it may incite 
restrictive practices – the kind of ‘clubbiness’ that, once preeminent, favours known 
authors in a closed circle of mutual citation (e.g. The Journal of Finance––at least 
according to outsiders!).5 
Using the lens of club economics does not immediately solve the financial 
problems of scholarly publishing, but it allows us to see these problems in a new way. 
In particular, we argue that it provides a better way of understanding how complex 
contributions are generating collective goods than current market models. While the 
analysis of complex situations requires more work and more detailed modelling we 
can already see that it offers a different diagnosis of the problems and will therefore 
point the way to new solutions. 
 
Understanding change 
Applying the model is one thing, showing that it is useful, ideally predictive, is quite 
another. A way to test this is to consider changes to our hypothetical journal from its 
native state as painted above. An obvious change, and one that more closely models 
reality for small society journals, is the expansion of authorship. What happens when 																																																								
5 For Cinema Journal, see http://www.cmstudies.org/?page=cinema_journal; and for The Journal of Finance, see 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-6261/homepage/Society.html, where ‘Membership in 
the Association is ... available only through written application’. 
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authors who are not society members seek to join the club by publishing in the 
journal? We expect entrepreneurialism at the margins, so that changes in who is 
excluded are likely to be framed as experiments. We also expect differential tolls 
owing to non-anonymous congestion. Authors who bring prestige, or unique content 
that adds to the prestige of journal, or attract new membership, are therefore likely to 
be sought out, with formal membership ‘requirements’ and payments being waived, 
e.g., by the award of an Honorary Fellowship or allowing a celebrity author to retain 
copyright over their material, etc. The calculus for the author will depend on the 
externalities the club provides, prestige, a particular readership. 
 
Emerging technologies and knowledge clubs 
The implications of seeing scholarly journals as club goods, as opposed to public or 
private goods, is that we can begin to formulate clear models, and—with emerging 
technologies—to enact them. The club aspects of scholarly journals involve 
delivering prestige factors for those within the community of peer producers, as well 
as practical distribution mechanisms required to ensure that mutual attention within 
the knowledge club is secured. In the digital environment, academic journals have 
retained their club-like qualities through blind peer review (and even more so though 
open review), and via editorial boards that are carefully constructed to ‘send the right 
signals’ in order to build prestige and quality assurance. However, as described above, 
in the case of commercial scholarly journals, those who do the work to generate these 
externalities for the group are outsourcing production to commercial companies, as 
well as the infrastructures that measure and reveal citations and impact factors. 
Emerging technologies hold promise in that they may enable new forms of 
automated coordination that overcome the need to outsource publication, distribution 
and search, thereby returning these functions to the knowledge club itself. 
Understanding journals as club goods is useful here because it allows us to interrogate 
which parts of the current system we might wish to protect or enhance, and which are 
superfluous or detrimental to knowledge productivity.  
Blockchain technology has been described as a giant distributed ledger (Swan 
2015) used for asset registry, inventory and exchange, originally built for Bitcoin but 
increasingly applied to other systems including legal contracts and identity 
verification. The importance of blockchain technology is that it can achieve trust (a 
major ‘club’ benefit) on a trustless (open network) internet through encryption and 
automation. As Buterin (2015) writes, blockchain is not about enforcing one set of 
rules, but ‘creating the freedom to create a new mechanism with a new ruleset 
extremely quickly and pushing it out’. Blockchain technology can thereby provide a 
technical layer upon which decentralised governance systems can run. In the case of 
scholarly publishing, blockchain could be used to resolve current weaknesses in the 
system including securing peer-review and generating trusted and open citation 
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metrics. For instance, blockchain technology can transform attributes such as citations 
into token-like objects, resulting in trustworthy open metrics as opposed to proprietary 
database systems. A token-like system could also shift what is currently volunteer-
based labour into an incentive-compatible system that rewards referees and editors, 
not just authors. For instance, refereeing journal articles might result in 
micropayments (either monetary or reputation-based) that accrue to those who 
perform such tasks, providing transparency of labour on the production side and 
encouraging those within the club to perform tasks that, under current conditions, are 
becoming increasing difficult to procure (to such an extent that Big 5 publishers now 
routinely offer incentives to reviewers, such as discounted prices on their products). 
Platforms such as Steem,6 whilst experimental at the time of writing, work on similar 
systems whereby a complete infrastructure could be developed.  
Such technologies could also be used to authenticate academic works that 
have been through the process of peer-review and editorial acceptance. If a scholarly 
work has been assigned the value of ‘accepted’ on the blockchain, then the need for 
physical or digital journal artefacts diminishes. It is foreseeable that an author could 
distribute a work through whatever means they feel is appropriate (for instance a 
university repository) and be assured that it possesses identifiers that prove the 
knowledge club (journal) has accepted the work. Those same identifiers could be used 
for searching, effectively bundling knowledge club outputs from across a distributed 
system, such that the knowledge club’s ‘ends’ (to form knowledge-making 
communities) are reprioritised over its ‘means’ (journals as consumer products). The 
journal itself may not be necessary, reducing or eliminating production costs 
altogether. This would mirror the current experience of many student-readers, who 
couldn’t care less about the journal, but search individual papers for ‘quotes’. For 
scholars, however, it may represent a more serious challenge, further individualising 
and commodifying the production of knowledge (individual authors and papers, 
detached from clubs and groups), and fragmenting or decomposing the culture of 
scholarship. Finding the best model of distributed governance for journals is therefore 
an important task. Different rewards for different kinds of contributions is one 
possibility; rewarding collaboration, interdisciplinary research, the re-testing of 
results, and other forms of club consolidation are just some possibilities. A question 
for further research and a problem for cultural science, then, is how to preserve the 
club (the ‘end’) while reducing the cost of the good (the ‘means’). Or should 
publishers transform their own business model into providing a service for knowledge 
clubs, supporting the formation of new clubs rather than relying on individual 
competitiveness among authors? 
   
																																																								
6 https://steem.io/	
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Conclusion: knowledge clubs evolve 
Scholarly publishing works best as a club good. This matters to economics because 
the standard diagnosis is that publishing is a private good with public good aspects, 
and is thus analysed through the lens of information economics and market failure. 
The consequence is a misdiagnosis: the crisis in scholarly publishing is not in fact an 
industrial transformation with complex consequences. If it is instead a process of club 
evolution, then what needs to happen is that scholars themselves will need to develop 
new and better governance models (e.g. Frey 2003, Gans 2017) to maintain the 
productive power of knowledge-making communities, rather than the prestige of 
restrictive titles. 
Knowledge clubs are communities with governance structures that evolve 
through differential variation and selection, largely through entry by new scholars, 
and exit as scholars leave, in the context of the institutional structure of clubs, through 
which scholars interact, in part through the mechanism of publishing. The arguments 
of Karl Popper (1963) and Thomas Kuhn (1970) on the nature and structure of 
scientific revolutions reinforce this club-like aspect of the dynamics of science, as 
does the history of important discipline-forming groups, including that of Austrian 
economics (Dekker 2016) and empirical science itself (Shirky 2010). To model 
scholarly publishing as a club good starts by focusing on the way in which scholarly 
output is produced and consumed. Producers of knowledge seek to interact with other 
producers, whose ideas they will also consume as a fuzzy set of that same knowledge. 
The gain from such club formation is ‘the ability to confer externalities on each other’ 
in the form of readership, critique and understanding, and is set against the congestion 
costs imposed, along with negative aspects of ‘clubbiness’ that may set in once 
exclusivity (status) is tradable in a ‘social network market’. The crowding costs are 
access to those same journal slots, which increases the larger the club. The general 
equilibrium logic is that there will be an optimal number of scholarly clubs (journals) 
and an optimal allocation of scholars over clubs. There will be a finite number of 
clubs, and each club will contain a finite number of scholars, and each scholar may be 
a member of several or many clubs. Club theory is the natural language of the 
economic analysis of scholarly publishing.  
However, knowledge is expansive and dynamic and not a zero-sum game. As 
the cultural science approach demonstrates, it is cultural as well as economic and it 
co-evolves with communication technologies. Thus, ‘general equilibrium’, ‘finite 
number’ are contextual terms in a larger frame of reference, applying only to 
incumbent players (already certified scholars). But communications technologies such 
as the internet—the very technologies that have undermined existing business 
models—are also generating new kinds of knowledge club beyond the purview and 
scope of scholarly communication as presently constituted. There remains an external 
‘creative destructive’ competitive pressure on scholarly institutions overall, be they 
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epistemological (disciplines), spatial (universities), local (specialist knowledge clubs) 
or institutional (publishers such as university presses). An implication is that scholars 
themselves need to attend to the dynamics of club-formation, which may already be 
much more advanced in informal DIY, start-up and entrepreneurial environments than 
in the papyrocentric universe of peer review journals. Creative destruction is at hand, 
but it is not publishers who need to worry most; it is those who generate knowledge—
production and consumption—without understanding the value of knowledge clubs 
and commons. If a journal is a club, we should be creating new types of journals that 
nurture the dynamic formation of new knowledge clubs. 
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